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Introduction
A significant but controversial issue in finance is the impact that debt financing has on a firm's investment decisions. In a frictionless and complete markets world, Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrate that leverage is irrelevant to a firm's investment choices and to the firm's value. However, in a world where there are incomplete markets and significant agency costs, leverage may have a varied and complex impact on investment.
In recent years empirical studies have been undertaken to examine the relevance of the debt financing and capital investment theories. Lang et al. (1996) , Aivazian et al. (2005a) , and Ahn et al. (2006) all report a negative relation between investment and debt financing although the correlation is much stronger for firms with low-growth. This evidence is consistent with the overinvestment story (Stulz, 1990) where leverage inhibits managers of low-growth firms from investing in non-profitable capital expenditures. These studies use data from the U.S. and Canada where long-term debt financing is provided by profit maximizing banks and public bond markets. Here, the debt-holders monitor and discipline the firms they lend to. However, the results from these studies do not necessarily generalize to transitional economies such as where the relations between lenders and borrowers are more complex.
Transitional economies are characterized as having nascent stock markets, an absence of public debt markets (or, at most, embryonic public debt markets), and a reliance on bank borrowing. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relations among debt financing, investment behavior, company growth, and performance for China's listed firms. We use data from 2006 to 2008. The opening up of China's economy and the adoption of free market principles has presented many investment opportunities for its listed firms. The average annual net investment by firms exceeds 34% of total assets in place at the beginning of the year and which helps account for China's staggering economic growth rate in the past 20 years.
Our study contributes to the several strands of researches that make up the investment and debt financing debate. Most empirical studies have used data from the U.S. and other developed countries that have a private, or quasi-private, banking sector. Using data from China allows us to analyze the investment and debt financing relation in a state-controlled banking environment that differs quite markedly from those in developed countries. Our results provide both supports for and against the findings from prior researches.
Related literature
Researches on the impact on investment from conflicts between shareholders and the creditor date from 1970s. In a seminal paper, Myers (1977) analyzes possible externalities generated by debt on shareholders' (and management's) optimal investment strategy. The idea is that debt overhang reduces the incentives of the shareholder-manager coalition in control of the firm to invest in positive netpresent-value investment opportunities, since the benefits accrue, at least partially, to the bondholders rather than fully to the shareholders.
At the very beginning, some researchers see this conflicts make little implication on investment, while, Jensen & Meeking(1976), and Myers(1977) suggest that the conflict between shareholders and creditors can induce inadequate investment and asset substitution. Further, Gavish and Kalay (1983) find, the asset substitution can be serious with the increase of debt. Berkovitch and Kim (1990) show how the financing contract brings impacts on the excessive investment.
Parrino and Weisbch(1999) find there does exist conflict between shareholders and creditor, and this conflict can go seriously with the increase of debt.
Except the conflict between shareholder and creditors, the conflict between shareholders and managers also exists. Berle and Means (1932) do the systematic research on this. Jensen (1986) points out debt can prevent the excessive investment.
These two conflicts caused by debt financing may jointly exist in any company, but under different circumstances one conflict may demonstrate more intense than the other. In order to further explain the impact of debt on different companies, we always divide the companies into high-growth companies and low-growth companies. Lang et al.(1996) , based on the data of industrial companies in the United States from 1970-1989, get that the negative relationship between investment and leverage only exist in low-growth company, while it does not exist in high-growth company. Aivazian (2005) find no matter whatever the growth is high or low, debt always has negative effects on investment. The negative effect on the low-growth company is stronger.
There are supports for both the overinvestment and the underinvestment theories in the extant empirical literature. McConnell and Servaes (1995) examine a large sample of non-financial US firms for the years of 1976, 1986, and 1988. Recently, Ahn et al. (2006) document that the negative relation between leverage and investment in diversified firms is significantly stronger for high Q segments than for low Q business segments, and is significantly stronger for non-core segments than for core segments. Among low-growth firms, the positive relation between leverage and firm value is significantly weaker in diversified firms than in focused firms. Their results suggest that the disciplinary benefits of debt are partially offset by the additional managerial discretion in allocating debt service to different business segments within a diversified organizational structure.
The differences in existing empirical results for high Q and low Q companies may be due to Q serving as a proxy for ease of access to the capital market. High Q firms (those with strong growth prospect) have expectations of higher cash flows, or net value, and this may reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems inherent in the supply of credit to the firm in the capital market. For firms with low Q, leverage would be a tighter constraint limiting investment, since such firms would find it harder to recapitalize given their perceived weak growth prospects. However, this argument does not explain the positive relation between leverage and firm value for low Q firms.
Hypothesis
There are three impacts of debt on investments: asset substitution, inadequate investment, excessive investment deduction. Under the first impact, there is a positive correlation between debt and investment; under the other two, there is a negative correlation between debt and investment. Under different market situation, different empirical results are obtained. The impact mechanism can be different, hence, the hypotheses we made should be boned in Chinese capital market.
Since there are conflicts among shareholder, manager, and creditor, the relationship between debt and investment is mostly significantly negative, but as to the growth of the different companies, the mechanism is different. As to low and mid-growth companies, on the one hand, lacking of the good investment opportunity, low risk of the investment project and the budget of the bank reduce the investment subjectivity caused by the conflicts between shareholder and creditor. On the other hand, debt can deduce the excessive investment caused by the conflicts between shareholder and manager. Hence, the higher proportion the debt in low or mid-growth companies, the lower the investment. As to the high-growth company, due to more investment opportunities, and the higher risk of the projects, the increasing proportion of debt may strengthen the asset substitution caused by conflicts between shareholder and creditor, which can increase the investment. But on the other hand, sometimes the higher risk of the project or asymmetric information can cause objective investment insussficiency, and debt can weaken the excessive investment caused by shareholder and manager, which reduces the investment. Hence, with the increasing of debt, the reduction of debt in the high-growth company is less than that in the low-growth company. Moreover, there is a positive relationship between debt and investment.
H1: in the low-growth (or mid-growth) company, there is a significant negative relationship between debt and investment.
H2: in the high-growth company, there is a significant relationship between debt and investment (positive or negative correlation) H3: the correlation coefficient between debt and investment in the high-growth company is less than that of the low-growth company.
Due to the unclear principal-agent relationship in state-owned companies, on the one hand, managers in state-owned companies do not need to undertake the risk of failure of investment, they easily go into excessive investment, furthermore, with the increasing debt, the probability of bankruptcy will increase, which doesn't threat the career of managers. Hence, the high debt of stateowned companies has little influence on excessive investment reduction. On the other hand, the unclear principal-agent relationship strengthen the conflicts between shareholder-creditor, with the higher the proportion of debt, the stronger motivation of asset substitution, because the bad debt from bank loans will be undertaken by country, and as the policy support from the country, these state-owned company can still get refinancing (Ping Xinqiao, 1998), the short of objective investment will decrease. These two situations in state-owned companies will weaken the negative relationship between debt and investment. Recently, with the reform of state-owned Banks, solve the problem of non-tradable shares of listed companies and the perfect governance structure of state-owned company, investment of stateowned company will have very big change, but inherent path dependence will not disappear.
H4：In state-owned company, there is a significant positive relationship between the proportion of debt and investment, and there would be excessive investment.
In non-state-owned company, there is a significant negative relationship between the proportion of debt and investment. In our model, the cash flow (CF it ), value of company (Tobin Q), income from sales (S i,t )are control variables. In order to examine the impact of debt on investment, we use OLS to inspect the relationship between investment and explanation variables.
Where I i,t /K i,t-1 indicates investment scale, DB i,t-1 is asset-liability ratio in time t-1, (I i,t /K i,t-1 ) i,t-1 is investment in time t-1, ROE i,t is net assets yield, CF i,t / K i,t-1 is cash flow from business activities, S i,t / K i,t-1 is net sales, TQ i,t-1 is Tobin Q in time t-1, LNSIZE i,t is the log value of total asset, Y t is the time fixed effect, H t company fixed effect, ε i,t is error term, I is company I, t indicates time t.
Variables

Dependent variables
We use investment as the dependent variable, the ratio of investment spending to capital accumulation (I i,t / K i,t-1 ) as a measure of corporate investment scale, which can eliminate the impact of the enterprise scale on investment. Investment I i,t is reflected by t-year's fixed assets, long-term investments, and the construction in progress. Capital accumulation K i,t-1 is the total asset of previous year (year t-1 ), which is also the total asset at the beginning of this year.
Independent variables
We use the asset-liability ratio in year t-1 as the independent variable, which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets in year t-1. The asset-liability ratio in year t-1 has more explanation power on firm than that of year t, because the distribution of interests between shareholders and creditors is based on the initial financing structure.
Control variables
Although this paper is focuses on the impacts of debt financing on investment, there are many other factors contributing to the investment activity, according to the theory of corporate investment. Hence, we follow the classic Q model, adding the important factors as the control variables: cash flow (CF it ), the enterprise value (Tobin Q value), the sales revenue (S i, t ), investment level in year t-1(I i,,t-1 /K i,t-2 ), net assets yield (ROE i,t ), the company size (LNSIZE it ), the time fixed effect (Y t ), and the corporate fixed effects (H i ). 
Empirical results
Group on firm's growth opportunities
Firstly, we rearrange the companies by the first three years average Tobin Q value, split the whole group into three subgroups: the high, middle and low-growth company according to the growth of company. The statistics description is presented in Table 2 , shown from which, and compared with low-growth or mid-growth companies, high-growth companies have the higher investment level. We notice that, since the real estate industry is a high debt industry, the average debt in high-growth company is at least 0.373, the average debt in low-growth company is at most 0.721, which is similar as Lehn and Racic(2002) who found that there is a negative relationship between debt and growth opportunity. This debt structure is good for the development of all companies, because according to the agent theory of debt, high debt is good for excessive investment reduction in the low-growth company, while low debt is good for releasing the conflicts between shareholder and manager in high-growth companies. The results also reveal that, compared with low or mid companies, high-growth companies have the higher Tobin Q, their cash flow and sales are lower.
The statistics about asset-liability ratio interval of different growth companies are presented in table3. Table 3 shows that no matter what growth the company is, there is negative relationship between investment and debt, and in another hand under the lower asset-liability ratio (20%-40%), the investment in median growth company is larger than that in the high-growth company. However, under the level of 40% to 60%, investment is lower in mid-growth company than in high-growth company, that is to say, the debt in mid-growth company has a significant positive effect. Meanwhile, from the standard deviation (St.d)of these two types of companies, we find St.d in high-growth company is 0.0217, St.d in mid-growth company is 0.0342, St.d in low-growth company is 0.0332.It means the investment decreases faster in mid-growth company with the increasing of asset-liability ratio. 
OLS results
With the help of SPSS16.0, we conduct multi-variable regression of three different growth type companies. Shown from Table 4 , we can see the coefficients and the significances are different, which reveals that the relationship between debt and investment in different types of company differs. As to the high-growth company, the coefficient is -0.085, which is significant under the 95% confidence. In low-growth companies, the coefficient is -0.147. That is to say, in time t-1, if the asset-liability ratio increases by 1%, there will be more 0.062% investment reduction in low-growth companies than in high-growth companies. With the increase of debt, the investment will decrease not only in highgrowth companies but also in low-growth companies. However, the investment decrease will be less in high-growth companies than in low-growth companies. The results verify the H1 and H2 the negative relationship between debt and investment in high-growth companies. They revel that the effect of debt reduces the excessive investment caused by the conflicts between shareholder and creditor.
Due to the fact that the higher the growth of the company, the more the investment is, if there is a good investment opportunity, the negative relationship between debt and investment can constrain normal investment activity, causing investment insufficiency. Debt effect on the investment in highgrowth companies is different from that in low-growth companies, which verifies H3. Our regression results also show that there is a positive relationship between investment and net asset yield, cash flow, Tobin Q, prime operating revenue ratio, and enterprise scale. These factors promote the investment of company.
From Table 4 we can see the coefficient before DB, is 0.116, which is significant under 90%. That is to say, debt promotes investment, which is different from H1. The reason is mid-growth companies have good risk management and they can easily get finance support from outside, hence, debt contributes largely to the growth of them. Note:***，**，* significant under the 99%,95%,90% confidence interval respectively, p-value in parentheses
Group on the shareholder structure
We conduct the regression on two types of companies: state-owned company and non-state-owned company. According to H4, we divide the state-owned company and non-state-owned company based on whether the proportion of state-owned shares is larger than 50% or not.
From Table 5 , we have the following findings: Firstly, the asset-liability ratio of state-owned company is 0.6005, larger than that of non-stateowned company's 0.5495. It implies that the constraint on finance of state-owned company is loose, they get financial support from bank easily.
Secondly, by comparing the standard deviation of average investment of two types of companies, we find the St.d of state-owned company is 0.0205 and the St.d of non-state owned company is 0.0316. It revels that, compared with non-state owned company, state-owned company's investment has a feature of high level and low volatility.
Thirdly, the Tobin Q in non-state owned company is higher than that of state-owned company, which reveals the higher efficiency of investment and the faster development of the non-state owned company. Table 6 shows some statistics of investment on the interval of asset-liability. The scale of investment of state-owned company goes up first and then goes down with the increasing of deb. The scale of the investment reaches the maximum in the debt interval from 0.4 to 0.6, which reveals there is an asset substitution tendency under the high debt situation.
We also find that the investment of non-state owned company decreases with the increase of debt, that is to say, debt has more constraint on the investment of the non-state owned company.
Table5. Statistics of groups on the shareholder structure As shown from Table 7 , the coefficiency of DB of state-owned company is larger than 0, which verifies H4. The excessive investment is seriously caused by the conflicts between shareholder and creditor in state-owned company. The reasons maybe:
Regression results
Firstly, most of the debt comes from state-owned banks due to the homology of the state-owned company and bank. So it induces the asset substitution and ignorance of bankruptcy of managers and strengthen the positive correlation of debt and investment. Secondly, the lack of corporate governance constrains the state-owned company. The lower efficiency of corporate governance, the more excessive investment managers are prone to. But from the regression result, we find the coefficient of DB is significant only fewer than 90%, partly because of the reform of state-owned company and the subsequent perfection of the corporate governance.
As to non state-owned company, the coefficient of DB is significantly negative, that is to say, constraint of debt on investment is strong. The reason is that cooperate property clearance induces a normalized relationship between company and bank. Hence, debt can put constraints on investment, prevent the excessive investment. Mean while, it is more difficult for the non state-owned company to get financial support. The result of the regression supports the H4.
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Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between debt financing and corporate investments based on various grouping of companies, which are classified based on the growth of a company and its shareholder structure. We employ multi-regressions method and get the following results:
We firstly divide our sample companies into low-growth, mid-growth and high-growth categories. We find there is a significant negative relationship between debt financing and investment behavior in high-growth and low-growth companies and the negative relationship is stronger in low-growth companies. There is a significant positive relationship in mid-growth company. As to low-growth companies, the higher level of debt will force them to give up investment. Meanwhile, debt can restrict the excessive investment in non-profit programs. Hence, it protects the interest of shareholders, which strengthen the negative correlation between debt financing and investment behavior. As to the highgrowth company, higher level of debt can induce the impulse in asset substitution. They invest in high risk projects in seek of high profits, though there exists risk of bankruptcy, which can restrict the investment behavior to some extent. As to the mid-growth companies, because they have sound risk management and are good at capturing investment opportunity, they can get external financing easily. So debt financing promotes their investment behavior.
In terms of shareholder structure, investment behavior of China's companies is also influenced by debt financing. However, great difference lies between state-owned company and non-state-owned company. Our research reveals there is a positive relationship between debt financing and investment behavior in state-owned company, while there is a negative relationship between debt financing and investment in non-state-owned company.
Finally, we discuss other factors that influence the investment behavior of a company. These Factors mainly include the net asset yield , the cash flow and the Tobin Q .All of them play a positive role in a company's investment. The higher the net asset yield and the more the cash flow, the more the company tends to expand. The higher the Tobin Q of a company, the easier for it to get financing, the more possible for it to make future investments..
